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Abstract. We study the security of a specific authentication procedure
of interest in the context of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). It works
as follows: use a secret but fixed Strongly Universal2 (SU2) hash function
and encrypt the output tag with a one-time pad (OTP). If the OTP is
completely secret, the expected time for an adversary to create a tag
for a chosen message is exponential in the tag length. If, however, the
OTP is partially known in each authentication round, as is the case in
practical QKD protocols, then the picture is different; the adversary’s
partial knowledge of the OTP in each authentication round gives partial
information on the secret hash function, and this weakens the authenti-
cation in later rounds. The effect of this is that the lifetime of the system
is linear in the length of the fixed key. This is supported by the compos-
ability theorem for QKD, that in this setting provides an upper bound to
the security loss on the secret hash function, which is exponential in the
number of authentication rounds. This needs to be taken into account
when using the protocol, since the authentication gets weakened at each
subsequent round and thus the QKD generated is key is not as strong as
when the authentication is strong. Some countermeasures are discussed
at the end of this paper.
Key words: Quantum key distribution, authentication, strongly uni-
versal hash functions, partially known key and composability.
1 Introduction
QKD is a provably secure key growing technique based on the laws of
quantum physics. It was first introduced by Bennett and Brassard in
1984 [1], and uses a so-called quantum channel that obeys the laws of
quantum physics, together with a public communication channel. A QKD
round consists of five steps: raw key generation on the quantum channel,
followed by sifting, error detection and reconciliation, privacy amplifica-
tion, and authentication on the public channel; see [2–7] for the details of
these steps. Practical implementations of QKD need a low-noise quantum
channel but also an immutable public communication channel. Without
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the latter, QKD can trivially be broken by a man-in-the-middle attack.
Therefore, secure message authentication is indispensable for the security
of QKD [8].
In the standard proposed QKD, authentication is achieved by using
the Wegman-Carter approach [9,10], based on the idea of Universal hash-
ing. The security of the Wegman-Carter authentication in the context of
QKD was studied in [11], noting some problems arising from usage of a
partially known key, and detailing some countermeasures.
1.1 Authentication with secret fixed hash function and OTP
The main goal of this paper is to study the security of authentication with
a fixed key in the context of QKD. Namely, we study the security of an
authentication procedure that works as follows: The legitimate commu-
nicating parties, Alice and Bob, share a secret but fixed hash function f
taken at random from a SU2 hash function family and a short secret key
to be used as OTP in advance. During the public discussion phase of each
QKD round, Alice sends the classical message and tag pair m + t with
t = f(m)⊕K, where K is an OTP, to Bob. Upon receiving the message-
tag pair (m, t), Bob verifies whether the message m did originate from
Alice by comparing f(m)⊕K to t: If they are identical, then he accepts
m as authentic; otherwise, he rejects it.
This authentication primitive was originally proposed by Wegman
and Carter in [10] with the intent to reduce the key consumption rate
of authentication. Low key consumption is essential in QKD, since the
key consumption rate of the used authentication directly influences the
key growing rate. Wegman-Carter authentication using an ε-ASU2 hash
function family has a key consumption rate which is logarithmic in the
message length, while using encrypted tags would reduce this; the rate is
linear in the tag length as the round count increases.
Partial knowledge of the OTP key K leaks information on secret but
fixed SU2 hash function f . In QKD, the privacy amplification step reduces
the information leaked to Eve during each round, but not all the way to
zero. Thus Eve may still have some partial knowledge of the OTP key
used for authentication in the subsequent rounds. This information, ε,
on the OTP key K in each round leaks ε information on the secret hash
function f . Intuitively, the information on f leaked to Eve is linear in the
number of authentication rounds. In what follows, we show that this is
really the case, and in fact Eve will eventually have enough knowledge of
the hash function f to enable her to create a tag for her forged message.
Furthermore, the composability theorem for QKD gives an exponential
upper bound for the security loss of the system.
1.2 Our contributions
In the case when the OTP key K is completely secret to Eve, it behaves
as an evenly distributed random variable to her (which is the reason for
the upper-case K notation). In this case, the best attack for Eve would be
to guess the value of tE, the tag value for her message mE. Since all tag
values are equally possible, the probability of each guess succeeding is one
divided by the size of all possible tags |T |. Furthermore, she can gain no
knowledge about the secret hash function f from guessing, because K in
the current round is independently distributed from previous rounds. The
probability of a successful guess would in each round be 1/|T | = 2− log |T |,
which implies that the expected lifetime
n = |T | = 2log |T | (1)
is exponential in the tag length log |T |.
We are interested in seeing how this exponential lifetime behavior
would change if Eve has some knowledge of K in each round. In the
remainder of this paper we estimate how many rounds it takes for Eve to
gain complete knowledge of the secret but fixed hash function f (taken
at random from an SU2 family), under the assumption that the practical
implementation of QKD protocol generates ε-perfect key in each run. We
refer to [12] for the definitions of perfect and ε-perfect keys, and of ideal
and ε-ideal protocols. Note that since the authentication primitive uses
a fixed SU2 hash function, the sequence of the security parameters for
the key stream generated from the QKD protocols cannot be made a
geometric sequence by increasing the protocol complexity at each run, as
discussed in [12]. By fixing Eve’s partial knowledge of the OTP key in
each authentication round, we derive an estimate for the lifetime of system
which is linear in the length of the key identifying f and proportional to
her partial knowledge of OTP.
This is not in conflict with the composable security of QKD, which
implies that the key generated by QKD can be used securely in classical
cryptographic tasks such as authentication [12,13]. In this case, however,
the authentication procedure itself degrades as the authentication round
count increases. Below, we show that the composability theorem for QKD
predicts that the security loss on the fixed secret hash function is expo-
nentially upper bounded in the number of authenticaton rounds.
It should be pointed out that the attack needs a large computational
capacity of the attacker. Usually, no bounds are imposed on the com-
putational capacity of an eavesdropper attacking a QKD system. This
is because QKD is provably secure based on laws of nature, rather than
computational complexity as is usually the case for key-sharing systems.
This large computational need of the attack will unfortunately limit sim-
ulations in this paper because of our bounded computational power.
1.3 Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an
attack and estimate its effect on the system under simplifying assump-
tions, and also present simulations on a SU2 hash function family, followed
by a modification to the attack that establishes the desired lifetime. Sec-
tion 3 contains the theoretical upper bound for the security loss predicted
by the composability theorem for QKD. Finally, Section 4 concludes the
paper.
Notation. In what follows, M is the set of messages, T is the set
of tags, H is a family of hash functions f : M → T with |H| = H + 1,
and Hi are integer-indexed subsets of H. Logarithms are in base 2. The
random variables used are K, N , and Xi, while lower-case m denotes a
message and t a tag, mE and tE are Eve’s message and attempt at a tag.
2 Attack and lifetime estimate
Eve would like to perform an attack which is better than simply guessing
the tag. Ideally, it should be better in two ways: it should succeed with
high probability, and should not be detected easily. Eve wants in essence
a good covert attack. The below description delineates an attack which
achieves both goals: the expected number of rounds until success will be
much lower than for the guessing attack, and in addition, the attack is
covert, meaning that Eve only listens to the communication between Alice
and Bob for a number of rounds, and only launches an attack when she
is sure that it will succeed.
The attack is as follows: Eve’s goal is to identify the used hash function
f among the H+1 hash functions inH, i.e., to eliminate H functions from
H. In each QKD round, Eve intercepts a valid (classical) message-tag pair
m+ t, where t = f(m)⊕K, from, say, Alice to Bob. The random variable
K (random to Eve) is not entirely evenly distributed because of Eve’s
partial knowledge. We will, in what follows, assume that her knowledge
is such that she knows a few values of K that has probability 0. She uses
this knowledge to identify possible candidates for f(m). This means that
in each run, Eve can identify a subset Hi out of all the possible hash
functions in H by eliminating the hash functions (in H) that do not hash
m to the set of possible candidates for f(m). The set Hi will consist of
the true match (the fixed secret hash function) and a number of false
matches.
The set Hi can in principle be of different size depending on the hash
function family, which hash function is used, and the message, but here
we are focusing on Strongly Universal hash function families and in this
case, the inverse image of any tag has the same size, and each subset has
the same size |Hi| = h. Therefore, Eve’s information on K in terms of
min-entropy translates directly into the quantity − log(h/H).
2.1 Bounds using simplifying assumptions
After i runs the set of possible hash functions will decrease to ∩ij=1Hj .
In general, the remaining number of false matches in this intersection is
a random variable
Xi = | ∩ij=1 Hj | − 1. (2)
We are interested in the expected time it takes until Eve has identified
the (no longer secret) true hash function, that is, the expectation of the
(random) index N that is the earliest that gives XN = 0 (such that
XN−1 ≥ 1).
By assuming that that each round is independent of the former,
and that each subset is exactly evenly distributed within the previous
subset, we obtain Xi = Xi−1h/H. This is only possible when the Xi
are continuous variables; we will analyze the discrete (integer-valued)
case below. With X0 = k we obtain X1 = kh/H, X2 = k(h/H)
2, . . . ,
Xl = k(h/H)
l. Now, our demand (XN = 0)∩ (XN−1 ≥ 1) translates into
(XN < 1) ∩ (XN−1 ≥ 1), which in turn implies that N |(X0 = k) is not
random in this case, but is in fact equal to a number nk for which
k( hH )
nk < 1 ≤ k( hH )nk−1, (3)
which after some algebra simplifies to
nk − 1 ≤ log k− log hH
< nk, (4)
that is,
nk =
⌈
log k
− log hH
⌉
. (5)
In particular, nH = dlogH/(− log(h/H))e, which means that the lifetime
of the system would be directly proportional to the key length1 divided
by the information on the OTP used in each step. This is what we would
expect of a system in which there is a constant gain of information in
each run.
In the discrete case, the analysis is more complicated. We extend to a
random draw of hash functions, but keep the assumption that each round
is independent of the former. This means that the probability of drawing
a hash function present in ∩i−1j=1Hj in run i only depends on Xi−1, which
corresponds to a random draw of h elements without replacement fromH,
where there are two types of elements: those in ∩i−1j=1Hj (Xi−1 of them),
and those outside the set. In other words, the number of hash functions
in ∩ij=1Hj given Xi−1 is hypergeometrically distributed, so that,
pjk := P (Xi = j|Xi−1 = k) =
(
k
j
)(
H−k
h−j
)(
H
h
) . (6)
The expected lifetime time when k false hash functions remain is
nk = E(N |X0 = k). (7)
Then, n0 = 0 and
nk =
k∑
j=0
E(N |X1 = j)P (X1 = j|X0 = k)
=
k∑
j=0
(
E(N |X0 = j) + 1
)
P (X1 = j|X0 = k) = 1 +
k∑
j=0
pjknj .
(8)
Solving for nk gives
nk =
1 +
∑k−1
j=0 pjknj
1− pkk , (9)
and since pjk, j = 0, 1, · · · , k, are given explicitly above, the nk can be
calculated from this equation, although the expressions are complicated.
The goal is to prove a logarithmic bound on nk in terms of k as in (5)
in general. Splitting the sum of (8) at the point s (just before the index
dse) gives
nk = 1 + ndse−1P (Xi < s|Xi−1 = k) + nkP (Xi > s|Xi−1 = k). (10)
1 Here, the length of the key identifying the secret hash function is actually log(H+1).
And now solving for nk gives
nk ≤ 1
1− P (Xi > s|Xi−1 = k) + ndse−1. (11)
If the probability in the denominator does not grow to fast when s de-
creases from k−1, we can use a value s sufficiently far from k to establish
logarithmic growth of nk in k. The one-sided Chebyshev inequality implies
P
(
(Xi > s
∣∣∣Xi−1 = k) ≤ V (Xi∣∣Xi−1 = k)
(s− E(Xi|Xi−1 = k))2 + V
(
Xi
∣∣Xi−1 = k) ,
(12)
so that
1
1− P
(
Xi ≥ s
∣∣∣Xi−1 = k) ≤
(
s− E(Xi∣∣Xi−1 = k))2 + V (Xi∣∣Xi−1 = k)(
s− E(Xi∣∣Xi−1 = k))2
= 1 +
V
(
Xi
∣∣Xi−1 = k)(
s− E(Xi∣∣Xi−1 = k))2 ≤ 1 +
k hH
(
1− hH
)
(
s− k hH
)2 .
(13)
This implies that
nk ≤ 1 +
k hH
(
1− hH
)
(
s− k hH
)2 + ndse−1. (14)
Note that even if dse and k coincide, the indices above do not. Now let
us prove using induction that
nk ≤ a + b log k (15)
with the appropriate a and b. A simple starting point is n1:
a = n1 =
1
1− hH
. (16)
Now, we assume (15) holds for k less than p ≥ 2 which implies
ndse−1 ≤ a + b log(dse − 1) ≤ a + b log s = b log
s
k
+ a0 + b log k, (17)
so that
np ≤ 1 +
k hH
(
1− hH
)
(
s− k hH
)2 + b log sk + a + b log k. (18)
Choosing
b = −
1 + k hH
(
1− hH
)
(
s− k hH
)2
/ log s
k
> 0 (19)
gives the desired
np ≤ a + b log p. (20)
By induction we obtain that the lifetime nk is bounded by
nk ≤ 1
1− hH
+
1 + k hH
(
1− hH
)
(
s− k hH
)2
 log k− log sk . (21)
If s is chosen proportional to k, the first term in the parenthesis will
dominate at large values of k, and the proportionality constant appears
in log s/k. Choosing s = k
√
h/H, then with similar calculations as above
we obtain
nk ≤ 1
1− hH
+
1 + 1 +
√
h
H
k(1−
√
h
H )
 2 log k
− log hH
, (22)
where the coefficient in front of the logarithm decreases to 1 when k in-
creases. The bound for nH is logarithmic in H and slightly larger than the
one in (5), which is natural taking the broadening of the distribution into
account. This is similar as in the previous more simplified situation; the
lifetime of the system is linear in the key length rather than exponential
in the tag length. We now need to check the remaining assumption that
each round is independent of the former: does the random draw in each
round follow a hypergeometric distribution?
2.2 Simulations for an SU2 Family
We want to simulate an authentication system with a secret fixed hash
function from a SU2 hash function family, where the tag is OTP encrypted
with a partially known key. Here, we restrict ourselves to a specific hash
function family from [9] as follows. LetM and T be finite sets of messages
and tags, respectively. Let p be smallest prime number greater than |M|.
For each integer 0 < q < p and 0 ≤ r < p, define a hash function
f(q,r) :M→ T by
f(q,r)(m) ≡ ((mq + r) mod p) mod |T |. (23)
Then, H1 = {f(q,r) : q ∈ Zp \ {0} and r ∈ Zp} is an SU2 hash function
family. This family was introduced as ”H1” in [9] (the index is not used
in the same way as in this paper), and is not quite SU2, in Wegman and
Carter’s own words: it is ”close”.
The parameters chosen for our simulations will admittedly be very re-
strictive and somewhat unrealistic when compared to a full-blown QKD
system. The reason for this is our bounded computational capabilities; as
already mentioned, no bound is usually imposed on an attacker in QKD,
but this does unfortunately not apply to authors of scientific papers. The
largest hash function family we will use will be of size 228, and our attack
uses the equivalent of round-by-round exhaustive search, by keeping track
of eliminated keys at each round, and this gives a high computational de-
mand. The hash function family size will not be kept fixed in the different
simulations. We use a set T of tags with size 27, and message setsM with
a varying size from 29 through 213. For each pair of M and T , there is a
corresponding hash function family H. We set Eve’s partial information
on the OTP key K to 10%, again an unrealistically high number, but
this is chosen to show the results qualitatively while still bounding the
lifetime of the system, see below.
The simulations are done as follows: a hash function f is taken at
random from the appropriate SU2 family. In each round, a message mi is
randomly drawn, and the tag ti is calculated using f . This tag is entered
into the set Ti, and more tags are randomly chosen from T to make
|Ti| = h|T |/|H|, which corresponds to a situation where Eve can use the
OTP-encrypted tag ti ⊕K together with her partial knowledge of K to
identify the set Ti. She then uses this set to identify the set of possible
hash functions Hi, and she forms the intersection ∩ij=1Hj . When the
intersection has been reduced to just one hash function, Eve has identified
f , and this is repeated many times to estimate the lifetime of the system,
the results can bee seen in Fig. 1.
As we can see, the lifetime is not as was estimated in (22). It now
increases exponentially as the key length increases, contrary to our ear-
lier linear estimate. The reason for this is that the rounds are not in-
dependent, at least not for this hash function family. This is especially
pronounced when there are few hash functions left: most of the increase
occurs when waiting for the last few false matches to disappear. Recall
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Fig. 1: The number of rounds until the secret hash function f is found
when it is taken at random from the family H1.
that the hash functions are eliminated by using the inverse image, for one
message in each round from a set of “possible” tags, to a set of “possible”
hash functions. And hash functions that have not been eliminated already
have a lower probability to be eliminated than they would in the case of
independent rounds.
However, Eve’s goal is not really finding the secret hash function f .
Eve’s objective is to be able to generate the correct tag for her (forged)
message, to breach security of the authentication. So far, our focus has
been on finding the secret hash function f . We note that even if the
remaining set ∩ij=1Hj contains more than one hash function, Eve can
generate the correct (unencrypted) tag for her message if all the remain-
ing hash functions map her message to the same value (say, tE). Eve can
check for this event, by comparing tags for her message for the different
remaining hash functions. When there are few hash functions remain-
ing, and they have a low probability to be eliminated, the probability is
high that a random message is mapped to the same tag by all remaining
hash functions. This means that the probability for Eve’s message to be
mapped to the same tag is high.
Eve also needs to identify the OTP to encrypt her tag. She can do that
when the remaining hash functions in ∩ij=1Hj also map Alice’s message
to the same value t (possibly different from tE). Using the value of t, Eve
can identify the OTP key K used, and use that to encrypt her tag. At this
point the system is broken. Changing the simulation so that Eve checks
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Fig. 2: The number of rounds until f is found under the uniform and
hypergeometric assumptions, and the number of rounds until Eve gains
enough information to generate the valid tag for her forged message.
for this event, gives a linear lifetime in the key length, as can be seen from
Fig. 2. The simulated lifetime is slightly shorter than the estimated value,
but Eve is solving a simpler task by not trying to identify the correct hash
function f but instead a subset that has the desired properties.
3 Upper bound to security loss
This is not in conflict with composable security of QKD [12,13]. Moreover,
the composability can be used to provide an upper bound to the security
loss on the fixed secret hash function. The composability theorem for
QKD states that if an ε1-ideal QKD protocol is composed with an ε2-
ideal cryptographic application, e.g., ε2-ideal authentication, the whole
system is ε1 + ε2-ideal. So, if an ε1-ideal QKD is composed with an ε2-
ideal authentication, then the whole system becomes ε1 + ε2-ideal and
generates an ε1 + ε2-perfect key. It was argued in [12] that the security
parameter for the key stream generated from the repeated use of QKD can
be made arbitrarily small by increasing the communication complexity
of the protocol; that is, by making the sequence of security parameters
for QKD-generated keys a geometric sequence. This unfortunately is not
possible with the authentication under consideration here. The present
authentication procedure uses a fixed secret SU2 hash function, and this
fixes the length of the message that can be authenticated. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the practical implementation of the QKD is
ε1-ideal at a constant ε1 in each round.
QKD Auth
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QKD Auth
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Fig. 3: Composability diagram of QKD with authentication with fixed key
followed by an OTP.
Now, let us look at the sequence of security loss on the secret but fixed
hash function f with help of the composability theorem (see Fig. 3).
– In the first round, the composed system of ε1-ideal QKD and ε2-
ideal authentication produces an ε1 + ε2-perfect key. A portion of this
ε1 + ε2-perfect QKD-generated key will be used as the OTP key for
the ε2-ideal authentication in the second round.
– In the second round, the composed system of ε1-ideal QKD and ε2-
ideal authentication using an ε1+ε2-perfect key produces an 2(ε1+ε2)-
perfect key. A portion of this 2(ε1+ε2)-perfect key will be used as the
OTP key for the authentication in the third round. Furthermore, the
ε1 + ε2 information on the OTP key leaks ε1 + ε2 information on the
fixed hash function, which makes the authentication ε1 + 2ε2-ideal.
– In the third round, the composed system of ε1-ideal QKD and ε1+2ε2-
ideal authentication using an 2(ε1+ε2)-perfect key produces an 4(ε1+
ε2)-perfect key. A portion of this 4(ε1+ε2)-perfect key will be used as
the OTP key for the authentication in the fourth round. Furthermore,
the 2(ε1+ε2) information on the OTP key leaks 2(ε1+ε2) information
on the fixed hash function, which makes the authentication 3ε1 + 4ε2-
ideal.
– In the fourth and following rounds, the process continues, doubling
the coefficient for each round.
The important property of this authentication scheme is that the infor-
mation gained on the fixed hash function f at the current round carries
through to the next round. In other words, the information leakage on
f at each round can be combined. Therefore, after the n-th round, the
information leaked to Eve on the secret but fixed hash function is (2n−1−
1)ε1 + 2
n−1ε2 so that the authentication becomes (2n−1 − 1)ε1 + 2n−1ε2-
ideal. The attack in Section 2 only assumes that the QKD generated key
in each round is equally strong; in other words, Eve’s knowledge of the
QKD generated key in each round is the same.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, the security of a specific authentication primitive is studied,
a primitive that uses a fixed secret hash function followed by a one-time-
pad encryption on the tag. This is of interest in QKD because of its low
consumption of secret key. We found that, by fixing Eve’s partial knowl-
edge of the OTP key in each QKD round, the lifetime of the system is
linear in the length of the fixed key. Moreover, using the composabil-
ity theorem, we found that the leakage of information on the secret but
fixed key is exponentially upper bounded in the number of authentication
rounds. A suitable countermeasure would be to change the fixed secret
key regularly, at an interval that ensures that Eve’s collected information
on the fixed key does not become too large. This would make the key
consumption rate again logarithmic in the message length, but at a rate
much lower than the standard Wegman-Carter authentication that uses
a new ε-ASU2 hash function in each round.
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